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Abstract A review of the academic research and practitioner best practices literature highlights 
how little we still know about the role that ownership control plays in the continuity of founder-
controlled and family-controlled firms. Founder-controlled firms have been shown to financially 
outperform other firms. Allowing for more nuanced findings given the heterogeneity of family 
businesses, a similar advantage has been found in family-controlled firms around the world when 
their performance is contrasted with that of management-controlled firms. Research points to 
generational and family participation effects that may contribute to a gradual decline in this 
advantage over the generations. Still, controlling families of family firms face the prospect of 
leading a family-controlled firm across generations that continues to derive the financial and 
noneconomic benefits of such control or to squander that opportunity by not having ownership 
control be a fundamental consideration in their owners’ strategy when facing a generational 
transition. Statutory ownership control, psychological ownership and family unity approaches are 
all considered in an exploration of a future ownership development perspective and approaches 
that controlling families can take to preserve ownership control and the resulting comparative 
advantage evidenced in higher financial and noneconomic returns over generations.
El control de la propiedad deteriora la estrategia y la cultura. La importancia del desarrollo 
de la propiedad antes de su transmisión
Resumen Una revisión de la investigación académica y la literatura sobre las mejores prácticas 
de los profesionales destaca lo poco que sabemos todavía sobre el papel que juega el control de 
propiedad en la continuidad tanto de las empresas controladas por el fundador como de aquellas 
controladas por la familia. Se ha demostrado que las empresas controladas por los fundadores su-
peran financieramente a otras empresas. Estudios más detallados, considerando la heterogeneidad 
de las empresas familiares, han encontrado una ventaja similar en las empresas controladas por la 
familia en todo el mundo cuando su desempeño se contrasta con el de las empresas controladas 
por la dirección. La investigación apunta a que la participación generacional y familiar pueden 
contribuir a una disminución gradual de esta ventaja a lo largo de las generaciones. A pesar de ello, 
las familias que controlan empresas familiares se enfrentan a la perspectiva de liderar una empresa 
controlada por la familia a lo largo de generaciones para continuar obteniendo los beneficios, tanto 
financieros como no económicos, de dicho control o de desperdiciar esa oportunidad al no tener que 
considerar el control de la propiedad como un elemento clave en la estrategia de sus propietarios 
cuando se enfrentan a una transición generacional. Los enfoques de control de propiedad legal, 
propiedad psicológica y unidad familiar son considerados en una exploración de una perspectiva de 
desarrollo de propiedad futura y los enfoques que las familias controladoras pueden adoptar para 
preservar el control de propiedad y la consiguiente ventaja comparativa, que se refleja en mayores 
retornos económicos y no económicos a lo largo de generaciones.
INSTITUTO DE LA         EMPRESA FAMILIAR
1. Author’s note: “Culture eats strategy for lunch” suggests the relative importance of these two managerial concepts and is attributed
to Peter Drucker in some of his early management articles. The title of this article suggests that ownership control is a more potent 
concept than either culture or strategy in explaining the strategic behavior and financial performance of family-owned companies.
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1. Introduction
Research on family enterprise has demonstrat-
ed the potential for financial outperformance 
of family-controlled firms when compared to 
management-controlled companies (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003). But whether it really constitutes 
outperformance is highly debated by academics 
and ranges widely given the heterogeneous and 
idiosyncratic nature of family businesses, and the 
industries and institutional contexts they oper-
ate in (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Madison, Kel-
lermanns, & Munyon, 2017; Villalonga & Amit, 
2006). More importantly, the reason for family 
business outperformance has not achieved con-
sensus in academia nor is it apparent among 
practitioners from best practices acknowledged 
in the literature (Cruz & Jiménez, 2017; Poza & 
Daugherty, 2017).
In this paper, we build a case for an ownership 
control advantage resulting in the financial out-
performance of family-owned firms. A hypothesis 
that from the author’s perspective as a practition-
er scholar with more than thirty years of experi-
ence in the academic and practice arenas of fam-
ily business, deserves more attention and research 
than it has received over the past two decades.
The corporate control literature suggests a meas-
urable financial impact from control transactions. 
In the public company arena, substitution of 
management for a different set of managers, for 
instance, often results in financial gains because 
assets increase in value and multiples on equity 
increase under better management. In both the 
public and private market arenas, the literature 
suggests that changes brought about by pruning 
or squeezing out shareholders or managers re-
duces the agency costs of principal-agent goal 
divergence and lowers financial control, admin-
istrative and other managerial costs (Easterbrook 
& Fischel, 1981-1982). Realignment of ownership 
control may also result in more effective pursuit 
and exploitation of growth opportunities avail-
able to the corporation (Easterbrook & Fischel, 
1981-1982).
The importance of the ownership control advan-
tage argument in founder-owned and family en-
terprises is particularly significant since family-
controlled firms constitute the single greatest 
contributor to economic activity worldwide. But 
the majority of both research and practice into 
these firms has been dedicated to entrepreneurial 
exits, family dynamics, family conflict, genera-
tional transition or succession and governance of 
the family and its corporate entities. As a result, 
research and best practices addressed in the lit-
erature have focused on the work of boards of di-
rectors, family councils, and the use of financial 
planners, organization development consultants, 
legal and wealth advisors, and family/individual 
psychologists (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1981-1982).
Practitioners in all of these specialty areas wres-
tle with ownership and its consequences in their 
work, but none target nor comprehensively ad-
dress ownership control itself as the focus of 
analysis, understanding and intervention in the 
pursuit of continuity.2 In responding to this chal-
lenge, this paper proposes an ownership develop-
ment perspective and set of practices to enhance 
responsible ownership control through the cycles 
and generations implicit in the founder-owned to 
family-owned business form. The absence of this 
perspective and accompanying practices may very 
well contribute to both the scarcity of firms that 
in the past continued to successfully grow and 
operate past the twenty-five-year mark and the 
observed drop-off in financial outperformance of 
founder-owned and family-owned firms over the 
generations. (A drop-off in the compounded annu-
al growth rate of share price of 3.3% - from 7.4% 
to 4.1% for example, has been reported between 
founder-owned firms and fifth generation family-
owned firms. Although even in their fifth genera-
tion of ownership, these firms outperformed the 
MSCI All Countries World Index that registers a 
compounded annual share price increase of only 
2.1%) (Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2016).
We begin by exploring the source of the financial 
outperformance of founder and family-controlled 
enterprises and the absence of research and best 
practices in the literature on the ownership con-
trol advantage. We proceed to propose a set of 
experiments and approaches that are aligned to 
the concept of ownership development as funda-
mental to the capacity to preserve the ownership 
control advantage and to have the family enter-
prise financially outperform across multiple gen-
erations of owners.
2. The Financial Outperformance Poten-
tial of Founder-Controlled and Family-Con-
trolled Businesses 
In the United States, family firms account for 49 
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), or 
approximately $7.5 trillion, 85 percent of pri-
vate-sector employment, and about 86 percent 
of all jobs created between 1999 and 2009. In 
Germany, they represent 79 percent of all busi-
nesses and employ 44 percent of the working pop-
2. While very limited, some research on the impact of ownership control in family firms has been published. See, for example, Leit-
terstorf, M., & Wachter, M. (2016). Takeover premiums and family blockholders. Family Business Review, 29(2), 214–230.
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ulation. Family businesses are also ubiquitous in 
the economies of Spain and France, where they 
are estimated to represent 85 percent of all com-
panies and account for 42 and 49 percent of the 
employment, respectively. In Italy, India, and Latin 
American countries, the estimates skyrocket, with 
90 to 98 percent of all companies being family 
firms, accounting for approximately 80 percent of 
all employment. In Asia and the Middle East, they 
are estimated to comprise 95 percent of all busi-
nesses. And in some sectors, such as construction, 
retail, services, and wholesaling, the proportion is 
estimated to be as high as 99 percent worldwide 
(Poza & Daugherty, 2017).
A U.S. study noted that 35 percent of the S&P 500 
firms are family-controlled (with the families own-
ing nearly 18 percent of their firms’ outstanding 
equity), and these family-controlled firms out-
performed management-controlled firms by 6.65 
percent in return on assets (using either earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortiza-
tion [EBITDA] or net income) in the 10-year period 
between 1992 and 2001. Family firms were also 
responsible for creating an additional 10 percent 
in market value between 1992 and 1999, as com-
pared with the 65 percent of the S&P firms that are 
management-controlled (Anderson & Reeb, 2003)
Heterogeneity among family firms and differing 
definitions of what constitutes a family business, 
its generational stage, ownership levels of con-
trol, and management/governance effects (e.g., 
whether the CEO is a family member, whether the 
family is still active in management and/or the 
board) has resulted in some inconsistent findings 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006). But there is compel-
ling evidence that U.S. firms with founding-family 
ownership can perform better, on average, than 
nonfamily-owned firms. This strongly suggests that 
the benefits of family ownership influence often 
outweigh its costs. Costs which some argue are 
unique to the family business form as a result of 
principal-principal misalignment due to majority-
minority ownership, altruism towards family mem-
bers, etc. (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 
2001).
In Europe as a whole, family-controlled firms (with 
a minimum family stake of 50 percent) outper-
formed the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
Europe index by 16 percent annually “from 2001 
to 2006 (Maury, 2006). (The study controlled for 
size and sector effects, and neither of these was 
an important driver underlying the solid outper-
formance of family-controlled businesses.) Anoth-
er study of European family-controlled firms (this 
one with a minimum family stake of 10 percent 
and $1 billion in market capitalization) found that 
family companies outperformed the pan-European 
Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Index by 8 percent annually 
from the end of 1996 to the end of 2006 (Poza 
& Daugherty, 2017). A more recent study based 
on a 900 company index of founder and family-
controlled but publicly traded firms found that 
between 2006 and 2015, a ten year period that 
included the 2008 financial crisis, these firms had 
an excess return of 4.5% CAGR and generated 
twice the economic profit – earnings in excess of 
the opportunity cost of utilizing assets or capital 
- compared to the benchmark, the MSCI All Coun-
tries World Index (Credit Suisse Research Institute, 
2016).
Another study in the US found family companies 
outperforming the management-controlled uni-
verse even after teasing out all companies that 
had not made a generational transition and were 
still founder-owned from their sample. These 
companies produced considerably higher stock 
returns than their non-family counterparts. Inter-
estingly it attributed much of the outperformance 
to the ownership control. It argued that a family 
that both owns and controls a company avoids the 
classic agency problem; the natural tendency of 
professional managers to pursue some private in-
terests at the expense of their shareholders that 
confronts most publicly traded companies. And 
that the family’s concentrated, long-term invest-
ment in the company and knowledge of the busi-
ness made them an effective and highly motivated 
monitor of the business (McVey & Draho, 2005). 
Some of this outpeformance has been observed 
only when in combination with best governance 
practices in these later generation firms (Miller & 
LeBreton-Miller, 2006).
Notice that most of the data comes from family-
controlled but publicly traded firms (Lin, 2015). 
Research comparing the performance of the pri-
vately held universe has produced mixed results, 
that is, it has failed to conclusively point to found-
er-owned and family-owned firms outperform-
ing management-controlled firms, or vice versa3. 
This is hardly surprising given the heterogeneity 
of family firms and the different definitions being 
used by scholars in determining what constitutes a 
family business in the samples studied. Additional-
ly, privately held firms are notoriously reluctant to 
report reliable financial information to outsiders.
3. Ownership Control as Strategy
Ownership control in the world of family business 
is often considered by researchers and academics 
3. An exception to this is the study La Empresa Familiar en España, where privately-held firms in Spain were found to outperform 
management-controlled firms during the 2006-2013 period that included the great financial recession (Instituto de la Empresa Fa-
miliar, 2016).
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as an anachronism; a vestige of a dynastic and 
robber baron past or a misplaced obsession with 
the high locus of control exhibited by so many 
entrepreneurs. 
While it may be true that the intent to control 
ownership can be traced back to the entrepre-
neurial roots of many families in business, this 
strategic intention by an owning family can hard-
ly be considered a useless quirk, or antiquated 
tradition. Consider Larry Page and Sergei Brin, 
former chairman & CEO of Google, who as of this 
writing held 54% of the voting stock in Alphabet. 
Or Mark Zuckerberg, founder and chairman, Fa-
cebook, with control of 57% of the voting stock.
Facebook competitor Snapchat, went public with 
2 classes of stock. In that IPO, 100% of the shares 
had NO voting rights; but the founders (Spiegel 
& Murphy) retained 90% voting control. Dropbox 
went public in 2018 with founder Drew Houston 
getting 10X super-voting shares and 35% of the 
stock with his co-founder, thus retaining control. 
In fact, between 2005 and 2015, IPOs that have 
consisted of different classes of stock (super-
voting, voting and nonvoting) increased from 
1% to 14% of all offerings4. And in 2017, 67% of 
venture-backed tech companies that staged IPOs 
had super-voting shares for insiders, up from 
13% in 2010. Spotify shareholders issued spe-
cial “beneficiary certificates” to its founders in 
February 2018, in part because co-founder and 
CEO Daniel Ek wanted to maintain control of 
the music streaming service post-IPO. The cer-
tificates boosted the co-founders’ voting control 
to a combined 80.5%, or double their economic 
ownership5. Lyft’s IPO in 2019 granted found-
ers John Zimmer and Logan Green super-voting 
shares that allowed them to retain shareholder 
control6. And an old-fashioned family business, 
Levi-Strauss returned to the public markets in 
2019 in search of growth financing. But this time 
2 classes of stock were used, giving the found-
ing family ownership control and the long-term 
investment horizon they sought when first going 
private 30 years ago.7
And it is not just about control and the long-
term investment horizon, family business owners 
routinely disclose that it is about staying true to 
the founder’s vision, tapping the unique resource 
which is the founder’s mentality (Zook & Allen, 
2016) and sufficiently valuing the financial inde-
pendence and wealth-creating opportunities that 
ownership control provide for the founding gen-
eration and potentially for later generations too. 
In other words, today’s founders/owners believe 
that their controlling ownership is a fundamental 
contributor to the sustainability of their success-
ful business model and its resulting financial per-
formance.
4. Ownership Transition from a Financial 
and Tax Planning Perspective
As we have discussed above, ownership control 
represents a North Star for many business own-
ers. Still the family business research literature 
on this subject is almost non-existent and the 
practitioner literature on the topic is dominat-
ed by financial and tax planning considerations 
for the business entity and the family of wealth 
when it comes to generational transitions of own-
ership. 
Financial and tax planning has as its primary ob-
jective, an efficient ownership transition; one 
that reduces the total tax liability resulting from 
a change in owning and controlling generation. 
Its chief proponents work for financial institu-
tions and wealth management firms and their 
best practices receive ample coverage not just 
in professional and business journals but also in 
the mainstream media. Some of this literature 
is more legal in nature, and quite diverse given 
the very different institutional and statutory re-
gimes in different countries and even different 
states or provinces within those countries. (The 
exclusively legal perspective will be discussed in 
the next section as it is both very influential and 
widely used).
More rigorous academic research exists, some 
previously mentioned here, but neither the 
practitioner nor the academic literature has ad-
equately tied the very visible impact of tax sav-
ings during a transition to the continuity, future 
financial performance or continued success of 
founder-owned or family-owned businesses in 
transition. So, while the immediate impact of 
tax policy and regulations on wealth and wealth 
preservation is well documented in the literature, 
only by extension is its long-term impact on op-
erating businesses owned by families addressed. 
(And it is certainly hard to argue that a reduction 
in total taxes owed upon generational transition 
is not beneficial to the long-term viability of a 
family business. After all, their impact on flows 
of capital when compared to not deploying tax 
liability approaches in planning for an ownership 
transition is significant).
What the financial planning perspective most 
ignores is that families have non-economic ob-
4. Dealogic.  May 2018. www.dealogic.com 
5. Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2018.
6. Wall Street Journal, February 13, 2019.
7. Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2019.
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jectives which may very well be constrained or 
negatively impacted by tax planning and tax 
minimization strategies and approaches. Dr. Leon 
Danco, a pioneer in the family business field, of-
ten proclaimed in his articles and seminars that 
“business owners that let tax strategies dominate 
their succession planning get what they deserve; 
a lower tax bill and a business that will not sur-
vive across generations of owners”8.
5. Ownership Transition from a Legal 
Perspective
Corporate law is quite clear, well-developed 
and with a long history of precedents establish-
ing the rights and responsibilities of ownership 
and ownership control. It brilliantly distinguishes 
between economic interests and benefits (as in 
shareholder value and dividends) from control (as 
in voting and determining the outcome of a cor-
porate decision). Trusts and trust law also repre-
sent a well-developed body of powers and rules 
to guide decision-making and determine issues of 
tax liability and ownership control.
While in the United States and many other devel-
oped countries, minority rights are well recog-
nized and protected in the eyes of the law, own-
ership stake still establishes the hierarchy of cor-
porate control; not seniority or birth order as in 
a family, nor title, as in a managerial structure. 
This makes a recognition of ownership structure 
of paramount importance in any work being done 
with a family-owned company. The legal practi-
tioner literature acknowledges the importance of 
ownership control and generational transition of 
this ownership control. And while the legal profes-
sion also acknowledges the complicated and oner-
ous tax consequences of succession, it often fails 
to recognize the competing interests of family dy-
namics, family culture and identity, owner inten-
tions and other non-economic goals of a family in 
business. This oversight often leads to a myriad 
of unintended consequences for individual family 
members and the family unit as a whole from a 
generational transition process; from disengage-
ment to cut-offs from other family members to a 
sense of betrayal or a feeling of profound injustice 
that reverberates over several generations.
6. The Ownership Development Perspective: 
Recognizing the Fundamental Contribution 
of Ownership Control to the Strategy and 
Financial Performance of Family Enterprises
Much progress has been made in the past decade 
in differentiating between management and fam-
ily and therefore promoting professional manage-
ment of the family enterprise whether the CEO 
is a family member or not. Much less progress is 
evident in the literature, or in practice, on dif-
ferentiating family from ownership. While this 
is understandable given the very high correla-
tion between family and ownership group in the 
family enterprise, this oversight poses significant 
challenges to the responsible ownership of the 
firm.
There needs to be more systemic and holistic 
analysis and analysis-driven interventions on 
ownership that promote the continued idiosyn-
cratic advantage of the family-controlled form of 
enterprise across generations of owners. 
Much like the socio-emotional wealth (SEW) liter-
ature broadened the scope on the non-economic 
drivers of family-in-business behaviors and strat-
egies (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), the family busi-
ness literature and practice of the next decade 
needs to reflect a more thorough grappling with 
the unique dynamics of ownership control and its 
implications for transgenerational family enter-
prise. Owner-operators think and act differently 
than owners only. Family owners are significant-
ly different vis-à-vis the family enterprise than 
family members with no ownership stake. Minor-
ity and majority shareholders, the literature has 
documented, are also significantly different in 
their relationship to the firm (Schulze, Lubatkin, 
& Dino, 2003). More importantly, what all these 
differences represent to our understanding of 
the impact of ownership control on the endur-
ing comparative advantage of family-owned and 
family-controlled firms is far from clear and ac-
tionable.
But in the spirit of experimentation that leads 
to learning, and with the conviction that in the 
family business field practice often leads re-
search and therefore both the practitioner and 
academic literature, let me propose a series of 
possible interventions rooted in both the litera-
ture and practice that as a whole aim to increase 
the proactive management of ownership control 
in the search of the potential advantages it poses 
for the continued success of family enterprises.
7. Approaches that Focus on Ownership 
Control During Generational Transitions
Traditionally, legal and estate planning practice 
and literature have advocated for “pruning the 
family tree” as the first order of business in suc-
cession planning. The idea is to simplify owner-
ship control by whatever means available; birth 
order, gender, employment in the firm, wills and 
8. Personal conversations with Dr. Léon Danco by the author.
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inheritance, buy-sell agreements, trusts and es-
tates. Many examples of these are evident in 
sixth and seventh generation firms in the food, 
wine and agricultural industries, especially in Eu-
rope and Asia. 
These traditionally successful approaches have 
long historical precedent and have generally met 
the goal of preserving ownership control in the 
transition between a current and a next genera-
tion. But as societal expectations have changed 
worldwide, they often present unintended conse-
quences to family unity and therefore set-in mo-
tion dynamics that going forward conspire against 
future generational transitions that preserve the 
ownership control advantage.
More recently, the development of more sophisti-
cated governance structures, including independ-
ent or professional boards, private trust compa-
nies and owner councils aim to accommodate 
family group ownership and more collaborative 
approaches to ownership control. These provide 
for decision-making and control capabilities that 
the earlier statutory control approaches did not 
require.
Innovation in governance structures and social 
processes may go a long way in ensuring agility 
in decision-making while allowing for more col-
laborative, familial, approaches to ownership 
control. This innovation is urgently needed given 
the increased cultural diversity and geographic 
dispersion of multigenerational enterprise fami-
lies and the significance of the ownership con-
trol resource. The future ownership development 
perspective is a first step in that direction. What 
follows are a few approaches to consider with 
the same experimental discipline that today’s 
scale fast ventures are being pursued; develop an 
in-situ hypothesis for a particular case, test and 
expand or pivot based on the preliminary results.
8. Approaches that Promote Continued 
Ownership Control by Building Bridges 
Across Generations of Owners
“Even though you try to put people under con-
trol, it is impossible. The best way to control 
people is to encourage them to be mischievous. 
They will be in control in the wider sense. To 
give your sheep or cow a large spacious meadow 
is the way to control him” (Suzuki, 1970)
Perhaps the most predictable conflict between 
the generations is the conflict between incum-
bent generation and next generation members 
concerning the strategy of the firm. Technologi-
cal and societal changes that impact the fabric 
of next generation member’s lives serve up disa-
greements on doing business online, respecting 
traditional relationships and supply chains, the 
appropriateness of the current business model, 
the traditional organizational culture, leadership 
behaviors and practices. New ventures, funded 
by a family fund acting as family bank or seed 
capital fund and structured under market rules 
that are captured in contractual agreements 
represent an opportunity to channel the energy 
behind that predictable disagreement into risk-
managed opportunities. After all, most firms 
could benefit from the agility and innovation that 
may result from the natural talent and motiva-
tion of opportunity seekers and opportunity crea-
tors in the next generation. Their propensity for 
“mischievous” behavior may very well promote 
exploration and exploitation by harkening back 
to an entrepreneurial past and a future of re-
newed wealth creation. 
At the board level, board service in companies 
or subsidiaries controlled by the owning family 
that represent an easier challenge and there-
fore a lower-risk developmental opportunity for 
next generation members may be a good option. 
Cultivating next generation ownership talent in 
prestigious, less-complex and non-stigmatizing 
appointments to boards has shown promise in 
strategically preserving the family ownership 
advantage (Jeong, Kim, & Kim, 2021). Guest 
membership rotations by next generation fam-
ily members on the company’s (or companies’) 
boards is current best practice in many centen-
nial family companies (Poza & Daugherty, 2017). 
Board service internships in non-profits and other 
family firms in the owning family’s network also 
represent opportunities for the development of 
responsible ownership.
A family council, a family assembly, or regular 
family meetings are effective tools for engaging 
the family in dialogue about important matters, 
such as values and overall direction, and the re-
lationship of shareholders to the board. Indeed, 
one of the most important responsibilities of a 
family council is to serve as an effective commu-
nications link between the family and board of 
directors. The family council must make sure di-
rectors understand family objectives and that the 
family remains informed of the extent to which 
family objectives are achieved. 
The writing of a family constitution is a family 
council initiative and its dissemination and con-
sistent use as a reference for family member be-
havior, is a great contribution to a sense of win-
win and fairness among family members. 
Participation in the family council and family as-
sembly also represent an opportunity to benefi-
cially engage next generation members in ways 
other than board membership. It is not unusual, 
in the absence of this opportunity, to have next 
generation members grow up with the expecta-
tion of one day serving on the board of directors 
of their family company, regardless of what may 
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be ill-suited talents and self-serving motivations 
(Poza & Daugherty, 2017).
Special projects like the development of a social 
media strategy for the firm or research into how 
artificial intelligence or AI could be a strategic 
contributor to inventory control, supply chain 
management or pricing strategy by the firm, 
could be undertaken by next generation mem-
bers (who are in or recently graduated from uni-
versities) wanting to make a positive difference 
in how “their” family company leverages its busi-
ness model going forward. These projects would 
be tasked by the family council and could parallel 
board committee work or resemble a junior advi-
sory board to family leadership of the company.
9. Approaches that Promote Continued 
Ownership Control by Aligning Family 
Owners and Owner-Operators as Well 
as Wealth-Creators and Stewards of the 
Family’s Wealth
Paradoxically, nonfamily management with its ca-
pacity to set a higher standard for professional 
management of the firm can improve the align-
ment of owners and owner-operators. Nonfamily 
CEOs often play this role quite effectively as can 
nonfamily CFOs and other key management. They 
motivate family members to professionally exer-
cise their management responsibilities and en-
able owners who are not employees to hold their 
owner-operator relatives accountable in tradi-
tional managerial terms; goals met or unmet, 
variances from budget, etc.
A family office can also prove helpful in aligning 
owners and owner-operators in the same owning 
family group. While too much reliance on family 
office administrators can reduce the appropriate 
interdependence of owners, the interdependence 
that forces them to make decisions as a team 
and enriches their decision-making by the very 
diversity of their viewpoints, delegating a myriad 
of tasks and operational details to family office 
personnel does reduce the possibility of the own-
er’s diversity of thought progressively becoming a 
significant source of conflict.
Special projects by family members of any gener-
ation, on company-related subjects as discussed 
in the previous section, as well as on community-
related or philanthropic projects can also help 
align family owners and family owner-operators 
by reducing the “us and them” mentality that 
can emerge from the distinct experience and 
mindset of employed-in-the-firm family members 
and nonemployee family members. These would 
be tasked by a family council or family assembly 
and report progress periodically back to that gov-
ernance body.
An owners’ council could complement the gov-
ernance work of the company board and the fam-
ily council by focusing its work specifically on the 
ownership and ownership control of the family 
enterprise. It can be a vehicle for ensuring that 
the firm is managed in the interests of all fam-
ily shareholders. It can help foster the founder’s 
mentality that family shareholders be patient 
capitalists with a long-term investment horizon 
and that they remain committed to business con-
tinuity under the responsible ownership and con-
trol of family members.
Typical responsibilities of these owners’ councils 
include:
1. Create and oversee the functioning of fam-
ily governance bodies deemed essential to 
governing the family-business relationship. 
Ensure that their processes are well coordi-
nated and that they all support the priorities 
of shareholders and the board of directors.
2. Initiate the process of identifying candidates 
for independent director positions and family 
director positions on the board of directors 
and collaborate with other board members, 
or the nominating committee of the board, in 
the selection and onboarding of these direc-
tors. 
3. Write and publish an Owner’s Manual (Buf-
fet, 1996) where members of the family are 
informed and educated on what it means to 
be and what is expected of a shareholder of 
the family-controlled company. The rights and 
responsibilities of ownership and the ways in 
which the management of the firm can be 
evaluated to ensure that management (both 
family and nonfamily) remain accountable to 
shareholder priorities. 
Think about it. A consumer purchases an auto, a 
computer, even a toaster, and receives an own-
er’s manual with it. A family member becomes a 
shareholder, a much greater opportunity and re-
sponsibility, and receives little guidance or edu-
cation on how to operate and care for the enter-
prise now owned.
Finally, annual partnership agreements represent 
another opportunity to align the interests of own-
ers and owner-operators and therefore enhance 
the potential derived from ownership control. 
One such agreement was entered into every year 
by four sibling partners, where two were owner-
operators and two were owning family members. 
The four shareholders met every December to ask 
themselves whether their work and relationship 
over the past year met the standard and wheth-
er that meant that they wanted to continue as 
partners in the new year. This review sometimes 
meant a commitment to changes that needed to 
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be made. After agreeing to any changes and new 
principles, they drafted their new partnership 
agreement and recommitted to their partnership 
for the coming year.
10. Approaches that Promote Continued 
Ownership Control by Aligning Family Wealth 
and Family Unity in Future Generation 
Owners
Here too, an owners’ manual with a “Quick Start 
Guide” and orientation to business vision and 
mission, a family constitution, financial metrics, 
and trouble-shooting guide, as to what to do in 
the face of conflict often proves useful.
Family shareholder initiatives in philanthropy 
are another great unifier and therefore a con-
solidator of family control via family unity. Next 
generation members that participate in gifts 
and grant decisions or perform a donor-advisor 
role for family philanthropy effectively join the 
controlling team and through teamwork experi-
ence developmental opportunities in the family 
shareholder role. A shareholder group of a large 
retailer in America has the next generation mem-
bers participating in the annual family assembly 
meeting do due diligence on philanthropic initia-
tives they would like to individually support. Dur-
ing the family assembly, the shareholder group 
hosts a meeting that resembles an episode of 
“Shark Tank” where next generation members 
submit the proposals to careful scrutiny before 
deciding to put all of their funds behind the sin-
gle initiative they agree as a generational team 
to be the best. Even young family members who 
appear least interested in the family’s business 
come together around an initiative that all know 
is, even if indirectly so, funded out of the family 
business’ wealth creating capacity. 
Psychological ownership may not trump statutory 
ownership and control of an asset but can cer-
tainly assist in a coordinated fashion to amplify 
the family’s unity and resulting control of its as-
sets. 
An owners’ council, as previously discussed can 
also make a contribution to aligning family wealth 
and the benefits and opportunities they repre-
sent to family unity and ownership control. So 
too can the publication and dissemination among 
family shareholders of an owners’ manual and 
owners’ plan. Family business consultants often 
hear independent directors on a family business 
board ask, “What does the family want?” A writ-
ten document such as an owners’ plan provides 
a forum for the family to answer this question. 
The owners’ plan is intended to communicate to 
the board both the family’s general values and 
interests for the company and the more specific 
financial requirements expected by the owners. 
Dividend/distribution and reinvestment policies 
may be included as well as nonfinancial goals of 
the enterprise family (Daugherty, 2017).
Education in responsible ownership behaviors 
as part of annual family assembly meetings can 
also make a steady contribution to aligning fam-
ily wealth and family unity. Short sessions can 
educate and inform on financial metrics, business 
operations and provide opportunities for first-
hand customer experience of product/service. 
Conceptual or experiential learning modules can 
help develop psychological ownership and family-
firm identity formation. e.g., “ambassadors of 
the brand” and bring renewed appreciation for 
the family’s history in the business(es). Digital 
media conversations that renew the founder’s vi-
sion can also renew the sense of opportunities 
and the spirit of entrepreneurship in the context 
of the annual family assembly meeting.
11. Conclusions, Limitations and Suggested 
Future Research
Ownership control eats business strategy and or-
ganizational culture for lunch. A strategic focus 
on preserving ownership control as a tangible 
resource or strategic endowment offers founder-
controlled and family-controlled enterprises the 
potential of preserving the comparative advan-
tage responsible for the superior financial returns 
they enjoy relative to management-controlled 
firms. Traditional and innovative equity and trust 
ownership structures can make significant con-
tributions to this effect, but so can innovative 
governance, familial and ownership development 
approaches that build bridges over the increasing 
diversity of later generation families in business. 
A clear limitation of this work is that while we 
have acknowledged the traditional and innova-
tive legal and financial approaches to ownership 
control here, our focus has been instead on the 
developmental edge leading to ownership control 
in future generations; that is on approaches that 
build on the legal foundation but provide greater 
requisite variety befitting owning families plan-
ning for a future where the ownership control 
will be in the hands of a larger and more diverse 
family than during the founder stage. And while 
not the focus of this work, it is fair to say that 
innovation in legal and statutory regimes impact-
ing ownership control worldwide will continue 
whether in response to legal challenges or chang-
es in the overall social, political and economic 
climate and may very well better accommodate 
some of the generational transition challenges 
we have discussed. 
As with any work on family business, there is a 
possibility that the heterogeneity of the family 
business form itself limits the generalizability of 
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this work. Another limitation is the absence of a 
robust literature on the chosen subject. Future 
empirical research into the direct impact of own-
ership control on the financial performance of 
family-owned firms, perhaps like Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) with more extensive use of panel 
data sets from large samples, is suggested. Fur-
ther research on owner strategies aimed at pre-
serving the family control advantage over gen-
erations is also encouraged. Future work could 
apply quantitative and qualitative methodologies 
to shed light on causal relationships or embark on 
historical analysis or the use of cases in search of 
patterns or critical factors. Longitudinal studies, 
notwithstanding their difficulty, could be particu-
larly enlightening on this subject. 
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